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Abstract 
During the post 1991, financial system regulators have initiated many policy measures to enhance competition in the 
Indian Banking Sector. In the Indian context, competition has not been rigorously studied and hence, there is a need 
for more comprehensive analysis of competition in Indian banking sector. The article has applied PRH statistic for 
the panel data involving 36 banks for the period of 1994-2009 after the penetration of private banks. The article has 
found that there has been improvement in the degree of competition since 1994. Equity capital, as a control variable 
is influencing the level of competition. Analysis of competition allows the policy formulators to design proper 
liberalization measures, designing of financial products and business models to ensure greater competition in the 
banking sector.  
Keywords: Competition, Market structure, Indian Banking, Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, Concentration. 
 
1. Introduction  
Competition eliminates inefficiency that exists because of the underlying economic structure. Competition forces exit 
of inefficient firms and encourage the entry of low cost firms in the economic system. This process leads to gradual 
optimization of resources and building of efficient economic system where prices are not controlled by a single firm 
in the economy. The first most notable empirical model on competitive behavior was developed by Bain and is called 
the Structure-Conduct-Performance Paradigm. The S-C-P paradigm investigates whether a highly concentrated 
market causes a collusive behavior among large firms resulting in superior market performance.  According to 
Baumol’s theory, an efficient market can prevent entry of newer firms. New Empirical Industrial Organization (NEIO) 
was coined by Bresnahan (1989) and it focused on intra-industry comparisons.  NEIO brought about empirical 
analysis by measuring degree of market power and introduced a proper measure of conduct by adding a variable 
called Conjectural Variations (Berry and Pakes, 2003). Theory suggests that banking competition can be inferred 
directly from the mark-up of prices over marginal cost (Lerner, 1934). In recent years, increasing number of articles 
has investigated competition in the banking industry. Banking sector liberalization, financial markets deregulation, 
financial innovations and merger and consolidation of financial services sector have called for assessing the level of 
competition in the banking sector.  
Before the reforms in 1991, Indian Banks were working in a regulated system. Interest rates were controlled, credit 
was controlled, Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR) was high and Cash Reserves Ratio (CRR) requirements, were 
adversely affecting efficiency and financial stability. Even though there was rapid growth of deposits, profitability of 
banks was low. Committee on Financial System (CFS) was formed in 1991 as the survival of Indian Banking System 
was questioned due to wearing down of capital. The recommendations of the Committee focused on gradual reform 
measures to improve efficiency, productivity, competition and stability of the banking sector. Basel Committee 
recommendations on income recognition, asset classification, provisioning, capital adequacy and supervision were 
pursued at a steady pace. Significant changes in the competitive conditions in the Indian Banking System have been 
observed with the spreading of ownership of Public Sector Banks and flexible entry norms for private and foreign 
banks  
The article seeks to estimate the degree of competition in the Indian Banking Industry using a panel data structure. 
The assessment of competition will help in designing further liberalization policies particularly in the areas of 
product development, customers’ welfare, new entry norms, product pricing policy, capital planning, risk 
management and regional penetration of banking services.      
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2. Literature Review 
SCP paradigm has been tested in the banking industry to look at market structure and competition in banking. 
Literature has shown the limitations of SCP paradigm and the strongest critic has been the contestability theory. The 
contestability theory suggests that a concentrated banking industry can behave competitively if the hurdles for entry 
and exit are low (Baumol et al., 1982). This theory states that the threat of potential entry forces banks with large 
market shares to price their products competitively under conditions like contestable markets. A contestable market 
has no entry barriers, either economic or legal. If the proponents of the contestability theory are correct, widely 
expressed concerns about the domination of a country’s financial system by some type of financial intermediaries 
may be valid only to the extent that financial markets are not contestable (Nathan and Neave, 1989). 
Bresnahan (1982, 1989) and Lau (1982) estimated the mark-up of price over marginal cost as a measure of market 
power. This model was based on two structural equations, an inverse demand equation and a supply equation derived 
from the first order condition of profit maximization. Shaffer (1989) rejected the collusive conduct hypothesis with a 
sample of US banks. Shaffer (1993) found that the Canadian banks were competitive for the period 1965–1989 even 
with a relatively concentrated market. Berg and Kim (1996) showed that Cournot behavior is rejected in the 
Norwegian banking system. Fuentes and Sastre (1998) found that banks consolidation in Spain did not weaken the 
competition. Gruben and McComb (2003) found that Mexican banks, before 1995, marginal prices were set below 
marginal costs and concluded that the Mexican market was super-competitive.  
Panzar and Rosse (1987) explained that the sum of the elasticities of a firm’s revenue with respect to the firm’s input 
prices (PRH-statistic) can be used to identify the extent of competition in a market. Many studies have applied the 
PRH statistic approach to investigate competitive conditions and market structure in banking. Shaffer (1993) 
analyzed competitive structure in Canadian banking system for 25 years between 1965 and 1989. The findings were 
consistent with perfect competition and strongly rejected the hypothesis of joint monopoly. Thus, a highly 
concentrated market like Canada was found to be having very high competition, thus questioning the SCP model. 
Jeon et al (2010) articulated the effects of foreign bank entry in emerging countries and found that entry of foreign 
banks increased competition. If the entry were not through mergers or acquisitions, the competitive conditions were 
found to be better. Scott and Dunkelberg (2010) analyzed the impact of banks consolidation in US banking industry 
on small firm banking business. The article suggests that increased competition is negatively associated with both the 
change and level of deposit concentration.  
Market structure and level of competition influence the monetary policy formulation and thus financial stability of an 
economy. Oliviera et al (2010) analyzed competition in banking with respect to banks lending channel and its effects 
on the monetary policy and economy of a country. A large bank would not be affected much by monetary tightening 
by the government and hence the monetary policy would not be very effective and it would impact the smaller banks 
more. Gunji et al (2009) analysed the effects of monetary policy shocks on economies with differently competitive 
banking sectors. Vives (2010) analysed the trade-off between competition and stability looking at the recent financial 
crises and the overall reaction of policy regulators to the financial crises. Author said that liberalization led to an 
overall increase in competition in financial intermediaries’ along with the increase in incidences of financial crises.  
Carletti and Hartmann (2002) examined the relationship between competition policies and policies to preserve 
stability in the banking sector. Bank mergers were either reviewed by supervising authorities whose aim was to look 
at stability or by competition authorities whose aim was to control market power. It was believed that high levels of 
competition may have lead to instability because of higher risk taking by banks. Keeley (1990) tried to see the 
relationship between competition and stability using two pooled estimations. Capital-to-asset ratios for 85 large US 
bank holding companies between 1971 and 1986 were regressed on their market-to-book asset ratio and a set of 
controls.  
Assessment of competition in the financial sector of emerging market economies have been the  focus area of 
research primarily due to the changes that have taken place in these economies during the last two decades. 
Anzoategui et al (2010) assessed competition in the Russian banking system and compared the level of competition 
with similar economies like India, Brazil and China. Authors expressed that bank concentration was in line with 
similar sized countries; however, the number of banks was significantly higher in Russia. Al-Jarrah and Gharaibeh 
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(2009) analyzed the relationship between concentration and efficiency in Jordanian banking system and found that 
reduction in concentration did not lead to increase in efficiency suggesting that higher concentration before 
liberalization was not leading to welfare losses in Jordan during the period 2000-2005.  
Assessment of competition has been fairly well studied for the developed world. Competition studies for the 
developing nations have been of interest to researchers in the recent times due to economic reforms and financial 
sector liberalization initiated by these countries. The Indian banking sector has also gone through the process of 
deregulation and consolidation which is discussed in the section given below.  
 
3. Competition in Banking: The Indian Experience 
Indian banking sector have been an area of research for researcher who have focused mainly on the 
post-liberalization era. Saha and Ravishankar (2000) measured the relative efficiency of public sector banks in India 
and found that, barring few exceptions, the public sector banks have in general improved their efficiency over the 
years 1992 to 1995. Sathye (2003) found that foreign banks entry did not have significant impact on concentration in 
the Indian banking system. Bhattacharya and Das (2003) found that there was a significant change in the levels of 
concentration in early 1990s and despite a spate of mergers in the late 1990s, the level of concentration did not 
change significantly. Varma and Saini (2011) analyzed the impact of bank size on the conduct of bank. Using 
conjectural variation model the study found that the biggest banks charge the lowest mark-up, indicating the increase 
in bank size through consolidation may not have negative implications in terms of abuse of market power by big 
banks. Prasad and Saibal (2005) analyzed competition in the Indian banking sector using PRH statistic for the period 
1996-2004 and two sub periods 1996-1999 and 2000-2004. Findings suggest monopolistic competition for the 
overall period and the two sub-periods with higher levels of competition in the second sub-period.  Zhao et, al 
(2010) studied the impact of deregulation on competition and performance of Indian Banks and argued that 
deregulation lead to efficiency and better performance in banking industry.  
Looking at the literature review and above discussion, there is a requirement of formal approach to examine the level 
of competition in Indian Banking Sector after the liberalization taking into account deregulation, re-regulation and 
the post BASEL II period. 
 
4. Empirical Design 
Empirical assessment of degree competition in market are developed by Bresnahan (1982, 1989) and Lau (1982) and 
Panzar and Rosse(1987). The Breshanan model explains the profit-maximizing firms would select their prices and 
quantities at that level where marginal costs equal to their perceived marginal revenue. It is a general equilibrium 
model. Panzar –Rosse H-Statistic (PRH) explains the relationship between change in factor input prices and revenue 
earned by specific bank. Panzar and Rosse model examines with the help of bank level data whether firm-level 
conduct is in accordance with the theoretical models of perfect competition, monopolistic competition, or monopoly.  
Let y be a vector of decision variables that affect the bank’s revenues. Let z be a vector of variables exogenous to the 
firm that shift the bank’s revenue function so that R= R (y, z). The model assumes the bank’s costs also depend on y, 
so that C = C (y, w, t), where w is a vector of factor prices exogenous to the bank, and t is a vector of exogenous 
variables that shift the bank’s cost function. Thus the bank’s profits can be written as π = R- C = π (y, z, w, t). Let    
be the argument that maximizes the profit function and y1 be the output quantity that maximizes π (y, z, (1+h) w, t) 
where the scalar h is greater than or equal to zero. Let    = R (  , z) ≡ (be equivalent to) R* (z, w, t) and let R1 = R 
(  , z) ≡ R*(z, (1+h) w, t), where R* is the bank’s reduced-form revenue function. Then by definition,  
                                                                       
 
Since the cost function C is linearly homogenous in w, equation (1) can be written as 
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Further, 
                                                                                       
 
Multiplying both sides of equation (3) by (1+h) and adding the result to equation (2) yields the following: 
 
                                                                                                            
Dividing both sides of equation (4) by (-h2) yields 
       
 
 
                           
 
                                      
This non-parametric result indicates that a proportional cost increase results in decreased bank revenues. Assuming 
that the reduced-form revenue function is differentiable, taking the limit of equation (5) as h0 and dividing by R* 
yields 
     
     
    
  
                                                              
where the    are components of the vector w so that    denotes the price of the i-th input factor.  
Equation (6) describes a restriction for a profit-maximizing monopoly where the sum of the factor price elasticities of 
the monopolist’s reduced form revenue equation cannot be positive. Intuitively, the test statistic H indicates the 
percentage change in the bank’s equilibrium revenue resulting from a one-percent increase in all factor prices. 
Increased factor prices shifts up all cost curves, including average costs, total costs and marginal costs. As a result, 
the monopolist charges higher prices and the quantity decreases. In addition, since the monopolist works on the 
elastic section of the demand curve, total revenue decreases and H is less than or equal to zero. According to the 
model, all firms that operate in isolation, where their structural revenue functions do not depend on any other agent’s 
decision; will have an H that is non-positive.   
Thus, the Panzar and Rosse (1987) model measures competition based on the relationship between the bank’s factor 
prices and bank’s total revenue. If the H value or H-statistic is less than zero, the financial system is a joint monopoly 
or collusive. If the H value or H-statistic is greater than zero but less than one, the financial system is a monopolistic 
competition. When the H value or H-statistic is equal to one, the financial system is perfectly competitive. If the 
H-statistic is greater than one, then the standard cost conditions would suggest that revenue increases by more than 
costs when factor prices rise. For example, if banks have monopsony power, then higher revenues may be associated 
with higher factor prices and, under certain combinations of elasticities of demand and factor supply, H may be > 1. 
There have been various modifications of the Panzar Rosse model. The basic model can be described as given below:  
            
 
                                                         
where TR denotes total revenue, Wi the i-th input factor, and CF other firm specific control factors. PR H statistic 
shows the sum of input price elasticities.  
    
 
                                                                             
Equation (7) is the commonly used specification in the literature, though the choice of firm dependant and the 
firm-specific control variables varies. Some of the studies take interest income as revenues to capture only 
intermediation activities (Bikker and Haaf, 2002).Larger firm earn more revenues and is not related to input prices in 
anyways. Thus, some studies take Ln total assets as a firm specific control variable as shown in equation (7). Other 
studies take Ln TR/TA as the dependant variable in the PR model. This results in a Ln-Ln price equation instead of a 
Ln-Ln revenue equation.  The three versions of Panzar Rosse model are given below: 
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This form of Panzar Rosse H statistic has been used by Shaffer (2004) and other studies. The second form of Panzar 
Rosse model is: 
               
 
           
 
                                           
Another version of Panzar Rosse H statistic is: 
 
               
 
           
 
                              
This form has been used by Bikker and Groenveld (2000), Bikker and Haaf (2002), Claessens and Laeven (2004) 
and others.  
Accurate identification of the H-statistic is important.  This is done using an estimated revenue equation which is 
based on a static equilibrium model. So, it is required to make an assumption that markets are in long-run 
equilibrium at any given point of time. Competitive capital markets should equalize risk-adjusted returns across 
banks in equilibrium and thus the equilibrium profit rate should not be correlated with the factor input prices. A test 
of the market equilibrium assumption which should be applied through fixed effect estimation of the following 
regression: 
              
 
           
 
                           
where   = return on assets and the e statistic is E =   
 
 . The market equilibrium condition is E = 0.  
The standard procedure for estimation of the H-statistic involves the application of fixed effects (FE) regression to 
panel data for individual firms. Under this procedure, the correct identification of the H-statistic relies upon an 
assumption that markets are in long-run equilibrium at each point in time when the data are observed.  The panel 
data fixed effect revenue function can be written as follows: 
                                                                            
where i indexes banks and t indexes time. Ri,t is financial income as a measure of the revenue for bank i in year t; 
Wj,i,t is the price of factor input j (j = 1 for financial expenses, j = 2 for administrative and operating expenses, and j 
= 3 for personnel expenses), all measured as the ratio of each type of expense to total assets. xi,t is a vector of 
exogenous control variables at the bank level, which includes the ratio of equity to total assets, the ratio of net loans 
to total assets, and the ratio of other income to total assets. αi is an individual bank effect, and ei,t is a random 
disturbance term. In the equation, the PRH statistic is given by the sum of the elasticities of revenue with respect to 
input prices, (β1+ β2+ β3). Under monopoly, PRH < 0; under perfect competition, PRH = 1; and under monopolistic 
competition, 0 < PRH < 1. As in Vesala (1995) and Bikker and Haaf (2002), it can be interpreted that the estimates of 
the PRH statistic as providing a continuous measure of the level of competition, with larger values indicating 
stronger competition.  
Although the microeconomic theory underlying the Panzar- Rosse test is based on a static equilibrium framework, in 
practice adjustment towards equilibrium might be less than instantaneous, and markets might be out of equilibrium 
either occasionally, or frequently, or always. Goddard and Wilson (2009) suggest for a dynamic panel data structure 
to a dynamic model of the revenue function. They advocate for partial adjustment towards the long-run equilibrium 
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with a lagged dependent variable in the revenue equation and control variable for the revenue growth.    
                                                                                                  
 
Differentiating equation (2) w.r.t.        , we get, 
 
 
    
 
     
       
   
  
      
  
     
       
  
  
      
                                                                                           
In equation (3), we assume that           . Re-arranging equation (15), we get, 
     
       
 
      
    
 
  
    
                                                                                                          
Similarly, 
     
       
 
      
    
 
  
    
                                                                                                          
     
       
 
      
    
 
  
    
                                                                                                          
Now, 
  
     
       
 
      
    
 
     
       
 
      
    
 
     
       
 
      
    
                                                     
Thus, 
  
        
    
                                                                                                                        
Thus, we apply Goddard and Wilson (2009) approach for assessment of competition.  
 
5. Variable Description 
Total Revenue to Total Assets is taken as the dependent variables. Independent Variables are Employee Expenses, 
Administrative Expenses and Funds Expenses. One period lagged dependent variable has been introduced in the 
equation so as to capture the market equilibrium. Revenue growth depends upon the growth in credit, investment and 
other income, which in turn depend upon the availability of Capital as per Basel-II norms. Hence, the ratio of equity 
capital to total assets is considered as the control variable in the revenue equation. The study has used unit cost prices 
for funds, labour, administrative expenses and capital.  
Unit Cost Price for Funds : Ratio of Interest paid on funds to total funds 
Unit Cost Price for Capital : Ratio of interest paid on Tier-II bonds to Total Tier-II Bonds 
Unit Cost Price for Labour : Ratio of employee salaries and provisions to total number of employee. 
 
6. Sources of Data and Period of Study 
Data on above mentioned variables are collected from the Reserve Bank of India publication on      “Data on 
Indian Banking”. The period of study is spread over 1995 to 2009 and there are three panel data sets each 5 years. 
This would indicate the change in competition over time. 36 Commercial Banks, involving Public Sector, Domestic 
Private Sector and Foreign Banks have been considered in the analysis.  
 
7. Results and Discussion 
Competition in Banking has led to progressive decline in the market share of public sector banks and subsequent 
enhancement of market shares of domestic private sector banks and foreign banks.  The market share in terms of 
deposits and advances of public sector banks has declined from 85% in 1995 to 73% in 2009.  During this period 
market share of domestic private sector banks increased from 7% to 21% and that of foreign banks declined from 8% 
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to 6%. This indirectly indicates the stiff competition in the Indian Banking Sector. 
Competition has increased the employee cost significantly after the financial sector liberalization. Employee cost per 
unit (in Indian Rupee) increased from Rs.0.12 million per year in 1995 to Rs.0.57 million in 2009. On the other hand 
the cost of funds has declined from 6.50% in 1995 to 5.25% in 2009, primarily due to de-regulation of administered 
interest rate regime and significant reduction of pre-emption of credit. Over the years, profitability parameters have 
undergone drastic change because of enhanced competition. Net Interest Margin has reduced from around 3.5% in 
1995 to 2.5% in 2009. Profit margin (Operating profit to Total Assets) remains within the range of 1.75%-2% during 
the last 15 years, despite significant growth in the total assets of the banking industry. However, there has been a 
significant decline in the Yield on Advances from 12% in 1995 to around 8% in 2009 indicating the impact of 
competition. 
The econometric estimation of the Panzar–Rosse H-Statistic (PRH) is conducted for three different time periods 
spread over 1995-2009 to assess the level of competition.  During the period 1995-2009 the PRH statistic was 0.725, 
indicating thereby existence of monopolistic free–entry market conditions. The results reject the prevalence of 
monopoly and perfect competition as PRH statistic is neither zero nor one. To understand the progressive nature of 
competition entire panel is divided into three parts with each panel having 174 observations. Hausman test suggest 
the use of fixed effect panel data estimation over random effect estimation. 
Table -1 Panel Data Test Statistics 
  1995-2009 1995-1999 
  Chi-Square p-value Result Chi-Square p-value Result 
Breusch-Pagan 
Test  176.105 0.0000 
Random effect 
over OLS 56.8379 0.0000 
Random effect 
over OLS 
Hausman Test  48.9544 0.0000 
Fixed effect over 
Random Effect 42.5102 0.0000 
Fixed effect over 
Random Effect 
  2000-2004 2005-2009 
  Chi-Square p-value Result Chi-Square p-value Result 
Breusch-Pagan 
Test  53.3722 0.0000 
Random effect 
over OLS 25.2863 0.0000 
Random effect 
over OLS 
Hausman Test  22.471 0.0004 
Fixed effect over 
Random Effect 32.894 0.0004 
Fixed effect over 
Random Effect 
 
Table -2: Panel Period: 1995 –2009, Fixed Effect with 535 Observations, Dependent Variable: Ln (Total 
Revenue) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
Const. 0.282 0.083 3.386 0.001 
Ln_LC 0.061 0.009 7.197 <0.00001 
Ln_FC 0.516 0.019 26.969 <0.00001 
Ln_Size 1.018 0.011 91.815 <0.00001 
Ln_OptC 0.148 0.012 12.363 <0.00001 
Ln_Equity -0.043 0.010 -4.256 0.000 
Ln_TR_1 -0.013 0.004 -3.316 0.001 
R-squared   0.994 
Null Hypothesis for Common intercept F(2,526) 10.368*** 
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Linear restriction for PRH Statistic F(1,526) 828.570*** 
PRH Statistic ( Ln Lc+Ln Fc+ Ln OptC)   0.725 
PRH Statistic increased from 0.61 in 1995-99 to 0.84 in 2000-2004 indicating there by enhancement of competition. 
However during the period 2005-2009 the PRH statistic declined to 0.34 primarily due to more government control 
on banking sector because of Global financial crisis. 
 
Table -3 Panel Period: 1995 –1999 
Fixed Effect with 174 Observations, Dependent Variable: Ln (Total Revenue) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
Const -0.289 0.136 -2.127 0.035 
Ln_LC 0.127 0.016 8.132 <0.00001 
Ln_FC 0.350 0.045 7.851 <0.00001 
Ln_Size 1.092 0.012 89.389 <0.00001 
Ln_OptC 0.126 0.017 7.473 <0.00001 
Ln_Equity -0.101 0.010 -9.769 <0.00001 
Ln_TR_1 -0.012 0.005 -2.236 0.027 
R –squared 
 
0.995 
Null Hypothesis for Common intercept F(4,163) 7.331*** 
Linear restriction for PRH Statistic F(1,526) 157.6*** 
PRH Statistic ( Ln Lc+Ln Fc+ Ln OptC) 
 
0.610 
 
  Table -4 Panel Period: 2000 –2004 
  Fixed Effect with 174 Observations, Dependent Variable : Ln (Total Revenue) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
Const 0.427 0.146 2.917 0.004 
Ln_LC 0.138 0.022 6.181 <0.00001 
Ln_FC 0.627 0.039 15.959 <0.00001 
Ln_Size 1.006 0.019 54.116 <0.00001 
Ln_OptC 0.066 0.024 2.785 0.006 
Ln_Equity -0.041 0.017 -2.350 0.020 
Ln_TR_1 0.009 0.007 1.258 0.210 
R-squared   0.991 
Null Hypothesis for Common intercept F(4,164) 7.15*** 
Linear restriction for PRH Statistics F(1,164) 313.1*** 
PRH Statistic ( Ln Lc+Ln Fc+ Ln OptC)   0.840 
The ratio of equity to assets, as the control variable, is significant in all panels. This result is as per the Basel-II 
guidelines whereby growth in assets (Loans and Investments) depends upon the availability of equity capital or the 
capital adequacy ratio.  Size, as a scale variable, has significant impact on the total revenue. The scale variable 
differentiates banks on basis of balance sheet size and it is quite appropriate since size enable banks to command 
over market. 
 Table-6 Panel Period: 2005 –2009  Fixed Effect with 174 Observations, Dependent Variable: Ln (Total 
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Revenue) 
 Coefficient Std. Error t-ratio p-value 
Const -1.035 0.185 -5.589 <0.00001 
Ln_LC 0.073 0.020 3.655 0.000 
Ln_FC 0.198 0.044 4.531 0.000 
Ln_Size 0.960 0.021 45.782 <0.00001 
Ln_OptC 0.068 0.019 3.525 0.001 
Ln_Equity 0.027 0.019 1.391 0.166 
Ln_TR_1 -0.010 0.005 -1.886 0.061 
R squared   0.995 
Null Hypothesis for Common intercept F(4,163) 8.05*** 
Linear restriction for PRH Statistics F(1,163) 36.48*** 
PRH Statistic ( Ln Lc+Ln Fc+ Ln OptC)   0.341 
Contribution of Unit Price of Funds to PRH Statistic is significantly high in all periods. This also indicates the 
competition is quite significant in getting low cost funds and which primarily influence the revenue. The contribution 
of labor cost, though statistically significant in all panels, its contribution to competition or PRH statistic is low 
primarily due to availability of low cost trained manpower in India. The co-efficient of Operating cost in all the three 
panels is quite insignificant, indicating that the implementation of information technology over the years has reduced 
the operating cost  (other than wages and salaries) of Indian banks. 
8. Conclusion 
The study examines the degree of competition in the Indian Banking Sector after the financial sector reforms. 
Financial sector liberalization has improved the efficiency, productivity and stability of the Indian Banking Sector.  
With three sub-period panel data analysis, the article finds that there has been improvement in the degree of 
competition since 1995. The PRH Statistic, which is positive and less than 1, indicates that the Indian Banking 
System is monopolistically competitive. It is true and validated fact that about 70% of the banking system assets in 
India are owned state-owned banks. It is also found that unit price of funds has significant contribution in the PRH 
statistic. It means that revenue growth is highly elastic to the funds cost.  Equity capital, as a control variable, is 
found to be statistically significant indicating thereby the revenue growth and competition would be more dependent 
upon the availability of capital in future.  As a policy implication it can be inferred that future growth of Banks in 
India depends upon the enhancement of regulatory capital base. Bank size is positively related to revenue indicating 
the beneficial effects of diversification of assets. Monopolistic market structure of banks in India indicates few big 
banks may be controlling the market. As a policy implication the competition commission should focus on any 
formation of cartel by big banks. As a part of enhancing market efficiency and competition the banking sector 
regulator should emphasize on further opening of the banking sector so as to reduce the market influencing power of 
big banks.     
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